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ABSTRACT 
Advances in neuroscience offer the exciting prospect of understanding ‘free’ choices – the 
subject of the free will debate in philosophy. However, while physiological techniques and 
analysis have progressed rapidly to meet this challenge, task design has not. The challenge 
is now to develop laboratory tasks that adequately capture ‘free’ picking or choosing.  To 
isolate ‘internally’ generated intentions from those impelled by external stimulus, 
observers are asked to ‘choose freely’ or to wait for a felt ‘urge’. However, no previous 
work has explicitly distinguished between instructions that refer to ‘urges’ versus to 
‘choosing’. The philosopher Alfred Mele  (e.g., 2009; 2014) has argued that the distinction 
is of crucial conceptual importance, but the two have not yet been empirically 
distinguished. Here, we show that conscious and unconscious, task-irrelevant primes, bias 
observers’ binary choices when they are instructed to ‘choose freely’, not when they ‘wait 
for an urge’, underscoring the practical importance of Mele’s conceptual distinction. 
Neuroscience must incorporate this distinction if we are to understand processes 
underpinning free choice. 
 
(167 words) 
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Highlights: 
 
- Since the 1980’s, neuroscience has addressed philosophical debates around ‘free will’. 
 
- Previous work instructed observers to respond on the basis of a ‘free choice’ or a felt 
‘urge’, but did not distinguish between these two instructions. 
- We show that unconsciously-perceived prime stimuli selectively influence responses 
made on the basis of a free choice, but not of a felt urge. 
- This dissociation of the two instructions underscore the importance of distinguishing free 
choosing, or picking, from urge-based responses 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Human decision-making is accompanied by a compelling, subjective sense of being able to 
do otherwise: that our choices are not exhaustively determined by the reasons we cite for 
them, but rather are ‘up to us’ (e.g., Searle, 2001; Haggard, 2008; Griffith, 2005; 2010).   
The philosophical problem of ‘free will’ is a debate, rooted in antiquity, about how such 
subjective freedom is best reconciled with our understanding of human agents as physical 
systems – how our decisions are related to their non-conscious antecedents and, separately, 
in what sense the brain’s conscious processes hold authorship of our choices. In 
philosophy, libertarian views hold that choices are not exhaustively pre-determined by 
their psychological- or physiological- antecedents (e.g., Kane, 1998; Searle, 2001b; Clarke, 
2006; Tse, 2013). Conversely, most modern perspectives assume that choices are 
predetermined and that this is either compatible with choices being in some senses ‘free’ 
and ‘up to us’ (Dennett, 1984, Frankfurt, 1969; Holton, 2006; 2009) or the two claims are 
incompatible and our choices are not free (e.g., Honderich, 1988; Wegner, 2002, Harris, 
2012; Pereboom, 2001). Philosophy has articulated the limitations of each view, but a firm 
resolution will require measurement of those brain processes responsible for choice. 
 For more than 30 years, to address this debate, neuroimaging and stimulation 
techniques have been exploited to predict, and to manipulate, choices. The essential logic 
of those studies was that if physiological measures could be used to predict (or to control) 
which choice a person would make, before they themselves reported being aware of 
making the choice, their choice would likely have been pre-determined, contrary to 
libertarian views. Moreover, if it could be demonstrated that processing akin to intention 
could be measured prior to conscious intention emerging, this may undermine the 
association of intentional-action and conscious awareness. 
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 Libet’s pioneering experiments used readiness potentials (Bereitschaftspotentials, 
BPs; Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965; a slowly rising signature in EEG preceding voluntary 
movement) to predict when observers would choose to make a button-press with their 
index finger (e.g., Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983; Libet, 1985). In those studies, the 
instructions to observers made reference to letting ‘the urge [our italics] to act appear on its 
own at any time without any preplanning or concentration on when to act’. Subjects were 
also asked to note the earliest awareness of the specific urge or intention to act, and to note 
the ‘clock’ position of a dot travelling in a circular path at 1 rotation every 2.5 seconds. 
The RP began around 350 ms prior to the estimated time of conscious awareness of the 
urge, wish, or decision to move, prompting Libet to suggest that, contrary to lay 
understanding of conscious free-will, the urge or choice to move had been determined by 
unconscious processes prior to the apparent moment of conscious choice.  
While initial reaction to Libet’s work was mixed, those tasks were a pioneering 
attempt to target internally generated responses in a task, rather than those elicited and 
controlled by external stimulus. Only internally generated responses could satisfy the 
requirement (for addressing ‘free will’) of unambiguously being ‘up to’ the observer. Self-
evidently, the general type and timing of choices in the laboratory will never be free of 
task demands  - the experimenters clearly want observers to make some responses during 
the session, and for responses to be of a very particular kind (index-finger button presses). 
However, the specifics of observers’ responses in the task (the timing, and in later 
examples, the nature specific response) were effectively up to the observer.  
Following Libet’s example, subsequent work has predicted of observers’ choices 
made on the basis of urges. For example, Soon, Brass, Heinze, and Haynes, (2008) used 
fMRI to predict ‘free’ decisions in a freely paced motor-decision task; observers were 
asked, when they felt the urge to do so, to freely choose between pressing one of two 
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buttons with their left or their right index fingers. Brain activity of prefrontal and parietal 
cortex encoded which button would be pressed by up to 10 s before their estimate of 
observers’ reported conscious decision (see also, Bode et al., 2011). This method was 
subsequently extended by Soon, He, Bode, and Haynes, (2013) to more abstract choices. 
Observers chose either to add or to subtract numbers when they felt the urge to do so.  
There is also compelling evidence for a causal role of particular brain areas in 
generating either urges or free-choices. Fried et al., (1991) stimulated the supplementary 
motor area (SMA) in patients with intractable epilepsy, eliciting a subjective ‘urge’ to 
perform a movement, or an ‘anticipation' that a movement was going to occur. Similar 
findings were obtained by Lim et al., (1994) and Desmurget et al., (2009); stimulation of 
posterior parietal cortex elicited spontaneous reports of “will,” “desire,” and “wanting to 
move”.  
As this brief review illustrates, there is substantial evidence that cortical activity 
predicts and influences either free choices or urges, or both of these. It has also become 
clear the distinguish responses on the basis of free-choice versus of felt urges; however, 
there has been no systematic effort, yet, to do so empirically (e.g., Mele, 2009; Roskies, 
2010; Bayne, 2011). Exactly what observers understood by an ‘urge’ in free-choice 
paradigms has proven difficult to ascertain - perhaps a bodily sensation, perceptual 
correlates of a motor plan or of being ‘about to move’. It is clear that an ‘urge’ to act, in 
everyday life, can be distinguished from forming an intention to act- someone who has quit 
smoking may feel a strong urge to smoke, but not decide to do so. However, in laboratory 
free-choice tasks that explicitly minimize stimulus-induced or bodily-state driven urges, 
this distinction becomes blurred. Perhaps, when a observer is asked to respond when they 
feel a spontaneous ‘urge to do so’, they interpret this as an instruction to make a 
spontaneous free choice of the type(s) that interest philosophers; perhaps not. Note, too, 
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that this issue cannot be satisfactorily resolved by arguments about what observers 
understand by an ‘urge’.  Instead, only a clear empirical dissociation of the two tasks will 
suffice. If responses made under instructions to press one of two buttons when the observer 
‘feels an urge’ to do so (an ‘urge’ instruction) were to differ markedly from those when the 
observer is asked simply to choose freely (a ‘free choice’ instruction), this would provide 
strong evidence that observers in previous studies had not processed urges in the same way 
as decisions. Here we report, to our knowledge, the first direct objective comparisons of 
responses made under urge and free-choice instructions, finding different effects of 
unconscious (or barely-perceptible) stimuli and conscious stimuli (in Experiment 3) upon 
performance in both of two experiments.  
To anticipate our conclusions, the current experiments find clear behavioural 
evidence of a dissociation between responses when observers are instructed to make free 
choices to act versus when observers are instructed to act on the basis of felt urges. This 
dissociation is evident in the effect that task-irrelevant prime stimuli exert on behaviour. 
Previous reports suggested that such stimuli, even when unconsciously perceived, can 
influence volitional executive processes and responses when observers are asked to make 
free choices (Lau & Passingham, 2007; Kiesel, Wagener, Kunde, Hoffmann, Fallgatter, et 
al. 2006; Ansorge, Kunde, & Kiefer, 2014; Manly, Fish, Griffiths, Molenveld, Zhou, et al. 
2014). Such findings presented an opportunity to compare the effects of unconsciously-
perceived stimuli on responses made under urge versus free choice instructions. In the first 
experiment, we sought to establish associations between each of two unconsciously-
perceived prime shapes and a left or right hand response, then to measure the effect of 
presenting these primes on responses when observers were asked either (i) to make a free 
choice as to which finger to press with, or (ii) to wait for an urge to press with either finger 
and then act upon it. We expected the masked prime shapes to affect processing in the free 
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choice task, given previous results, but did not make a prediction for the effect under urge 
instructions. In brief, the first experiment was designed to create the conditions in which 
actions on the basis of urge-based versus free-choice instructions might be dissociated.  
 
2 Experiment 1 – Simple Prime-Response Associations Established in Training Phase 
As outlined above, our first study exploited a procedure employed by Zhou & Davis 
(2012) to establish stimulus-response associations between arbitrary, unconsciously-
perceived prime shapes and left or right index-finger button presses. These associations 
have been found to influence subsequent free choices – if the associated prime is presented 
prior to an instruction to choose freely between a left or right button press. As such effects 
can be highly labile and vulnerable to differences in displays and timing, we first ran a 
pilot experiment to establish that such effects would arise using the procedure and 
apparatus used in Experiment 1. This is not reported in detail here, for brevity, but differed 
from Experiment 1 in that a prime shape was presented only ever once per trial. It yielded a 
significant influence on free choices in the direction reported by Zhou & Davis (2012): 
t(16)=-2.905, p=0.011. However, we suspected that this effect (a 2% bias in responses) 
would be too small to distinguish urge and free-choice conditions. We therefore conducted 
the experiment reported below, using the same paradigm but with repeated presentations of 
the prime stimulus (every 500 msec) during each trial of the test phase. Though we did not 
anticipate this, stronger unconscious stimulation in each trial due to repeated prime 
presentation gave rise to strong negative-compatibility effects (see Results and Discussion 
section) when observers were instructed to make free choices, but not when they were 
asked to respond on the basis of spontaneous urges. 
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2.1 METHOD 
2.1.1 Observers 
Forty-eight observers (24 in Experiment 1A: mean age 24.3, SD=4.3, 17 women, 24 in 
Experiment 1B: mean age 27.1, SD=6.5, 14 women) participated in Experiment 1 and gave 
informed written consent for their participation (power circa 0.8 for large effects in least 
powerful analyses). According to self-report, all but three observers were right-handed, and 
all had normal or corrected to normal vision and hearing. All observers received payment 
of £7. Two observers from Experiment 1A and 1 from Experiment 1B were excluded from 
group analyses due to responding with the same hand on more than 95% of occasions.  
 
2.1.2 Apparatus and Procedure 
The experiments were run on Dell PC with E-prime experiment generator software 
(Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2012) connected to a LS23A750DS/EN 23 inch LCD 
monitor, with brightness and contrast settings (60% and 75%, respectively) yielding 
approximate luminance values of 0.3 and 164 cdm-2 for black prime shapes and the white 
background, respectively. 
 
Training Phase: The training phase consisted of one block of 200 trials (following 15 
practice trials). Figure 1 schematises a typical display sequence within a trial, each of 
which began with a black central fixation cross, presented against a uniform white 
background. After 2000 msec, the fixation cross was replaced by a black prime shape 
appeared for 16 msec; on half the trials this was a diamond and the remaining trials, a 
square (each edge 37 mm).  The prime then disappeared for 16 msec, after which a visual 
mask formed by the superimposed outlines of both the square and diamond was presented 
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for 50 msec. The duration of the prime and masking were designed to render the primes 
consciously indistinguishable from one another. After the mask offset, a sequence of single 
uppercase letters (8 mm in height) was randomly generated and presented at fixation for 
500 msec. Simultaneously with presentation of the second, third or fourth letter (randomly 
allocated in each trial) a verbal instruction “left” or “right” was played instructing the 
observer to press the left or right response key, respectively. Further letters were displayed 
in succession until the observer’s response was registered. The observer’s task involved, 
not only pressing the key indicated by the auditory instruction, but also remembering the 
letter that was on the screen when they heard the auditory instruction. The observer had 
then to select that letter in a “response-mapping” display of three letters and a hash symbol. 
Observers selected the remembered letter with one of the four response keys operated by 
index and middle fingers of their two hands. The keys corresponded to the position of the 
four symbols on the “response-mapping” display (illustrated in Figure 1). Although we 
were not particularly concerned with observer’s subjective timing of the auditory signal, 
this feature of the task served to separate the observer’s responses to minimize biasing 
effects of one response upon the next.  
During the training phase, each particular prime shape (e.g., a diamond) was always 
presented prior to a particular auditory instruction (e.g., ‘left’). Hence, we expected that 
observers would come to associate each of two unconsciously-perceived prime shapes 
(diamond, square) with a particular response (left button press, right button press). The 
mapping of prime to response was consistent within an observer, but counterbalanced 
across observers. 
 
Test Phase: The test phase consisted of one block of 100 trials. Each trial began with a 
black central fixation cross presented against a uniform white background for 5000 msec. 
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This long preparatory period was intended to help the observer minimise influences of 
previous choices on their current choice. The same stimulus sequences were presented as 
for the training task, except that no auditory instruction was presented and a masked-prime 
display was introduced in between each letter frame, i.e., every 500 msec (display 
sequence schematised in Figure 2). Observers were instructed to look at the letter stream 
and to press either the left or right key according to the following instructions. In 
Experiment 1A, the observers were instructed to make a ‘free choice’ on every trial 
between pressing the left or right response within a frame of 5 seconds, not to press on the 
basis of an ‘urge’ to respond and not to take into account any previous choices. In 
Experiment 1B, (other) observers were instructed to wait until they ‘felt an urge’ to press 
one button or the other and not to take into account any previous choices. In both 
experiments, if a response was not made after 5 seconds, the instruction “respond now” 
was presented, disappearing when the observer responded. As in the Training Phase, 
observers were also asked to remember the letter that was on the screen when they made 
their free choice (Experiment 1A) or felt the conscious urge (Experiment 1B) to press the 
button, and to select it from the response-mapping display. Observers’ responses were 
coded in relation to the prime shape presented in each trial. If the response was the same 
response associated with the prime shape in the Training Phase, the response was coded as 
‘congruent’, otherwise as “incongruent”. Our primary measure was the proportion of 
congruent responses in each condition.  
 
Discrimination Task: Finally, observers completed a 100-trials forced-choice 
diamond/square identification task in which the prime shapes were presented in random 
order. The structure of the trials was similar to that in the previous phases but after three 
letter presentations observers had to respond by pressing one of two keys (1 or 4 on the 
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numeric keypad to the right of the keyboard), without subsequent screen for the selection 
of the letter. The primes were presented in random order and the key response was 
counterbalanced across observers. A “beep” signalled an incorrect response, allowing 
observers to maximise their discrimination of the prime stimuli. After the discrimination 
task observers were asked whether they thought they could discriminate to assess their 
subjective awareness of the primes.  
 
2.1.3 Procedure  
The observers were tested individually in room under low illumination. They sat facing a 
computer screen at a comfortable viewing distance. Observers were given written task 
instructions, but not informed about the shapes of the primes that were presented. The 
observers each received written task instructions prior to the Training Phase Task and a 
separate set of instructions prior to the Test Phase Task. Finally, the observers were 
informed of the primes’ shapes and were asked to perform the Discrimination Task. 
 
2.2 RESULTS 
Training Phase: Observer accuracy in performing the left/right response was 94.6% in 
average (94.6%, SD=3.2 for Expt. 1A; 94.6%, SD=5.6 for Expt. 1B). The mean accuracy 
for choosing the correct letter was only 62.2%, SD=36.2 for Experiment 1A and 77.7%, 
SD=26.3 for Experiment 1B. While these low means entirely reflected extremely low 
accuracy scores in 3 observers from Experiment 1A, it became clear that this was, for some 
observers, a challenging task whose accuracy we could not determine in the Test session. 
Accordingly, we elected not to analyse these subjective moments of choice/urge in the Test 
Phase (their purpose in these experiments, anyway, had been primarily to provide a task 
that separated the choice responses in the test phase). 
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Test Phase: We plotted the percentage Incongruent and Congruent responses for observers 
who performed the Test Phase with Free Choice Instructions (see Figure 3; Experiment 
1A, left-hand axis, left pair of columns) versus with ‘Urge’ Instructions (Experiment 1B, 
left-hand axis, right pair of columns). Both Incongruent and Congruent were included so 
that each could be related to the mean RT for those trials, indicated on the same plot (right-
hand axis). Visual inspection of the plot suggested that in Experiment 1A (Free-Choice 
Instructions), the percentage of observers’ choices that were congruent with the prime 
shape presented on the same trial (46.7%) differed from chance (50%); confirmed in a one-
sample, two-tailed t-test (t(22)=2.92, p=0.008, d=0.53). This was not the case for 
Experiment 1B (Urge Instructions), in which the percentage of congruent responses was 
49.6%, not significantly different from 50% (t(23)=0.39, ns). Comparing the relative bias 
in the two experiments, an unrelated t-test indicated that the bias in Experiment 1A 
differed marginally from that in Experiment 1B (t(43)=2.04, p=0.048 1, d=0.29). Inter-
observer means of mean RTs for Experiment 1A and 1B appeared, in the plot reproduced 
in Figure 3, to show shorter RTs for Experiment 1A than 1B (1634 and 2122 msec, 
respectively), but no influence of Prime Congruency. A two-way, mixed ANOVA, with 
factors of Experiment (1A, Free Choice Instructions versus 1B, Urge Instructions) and 
Prime Congruency (Congruent versus Incongruent) yielded a main effect of Experiment, 
F(1,23)=4.71, p=0.041, η2p =0.17, but not main effect of Prime Congruency or any 
Interaction (both F’s<0.1, ns; neither experiment showed any effect individually, both 
F’s<1, ns).  
To preclude the possibility that different Congruency effects on choices in 
Experiment 1A versus 1B reflected faster RTs in 1A than 1B, we equalised mean RTs in 
                                                
1 It transpired that these results were affected very slightly by our exclusion of observers who had responded 
with the same hand on nearly every trial; the whole sample showed the same pattern of results: t(24)=2.93, 
p=0.008 and t(24)=0.43, ns, for Exp1A and 1B respectively; interaction between Experiment and 
Congruency for the Response Bias, t(46)=1.97, p=0.054.  
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the two groups by removing faster observers in Experiment 1A and slower observers in 
Experiment 1B (4 of each), until mean RTs were equated in the two Experiments. Re-
running the independent t-test comparing percentage Congruent responses in Experiment 
1A vs 1B within this matched subset of RTs, revealed a significant difference between the 
effects in the two conditions, (t(38)=-2.49, p=0.017, d=0.37) despite the reduced sample 
size (see Figure 4). If anything, differences in RTs between Experiments 1A and 1B had 
greatly minimised, rather than exacerbated, the dissociation we noted here. 
Finally, to preclude the possibility that longest RTs in responses (i.e. those 
responses made after the instruction of ‘response now’ was presented), were affecting in a 
different way free choices and urges, we filtered trials in which RTs were longer than 5820 
msec (0.96% of trials for Expt. 1A and 2.37% of trials for Expt. 1B). Reanalysis showed 
the same pattern of results, for Expt. 1A (t(22)=-2.80, p=0.011, d=0.51),  Expt. 1B (t(23)=-
0.13, ns) and the different in Congruency effect between them, t(43)=2.10, p=0.041, 
d=0.31. 
Prime discrimination: On the basis of binomial tests for each observer, accuracy of 
discrimination differed from chance for only one observer in each Experiment (p’s=0.012 
and 0.035, respectively). However, in Experiment 1A, on average, performance was below 
chance (mean=47.23%, SD=4.34, (t(22)=-2.99, p=0.007, d=0.55) and not for Experiment 
1B (mean=50.65%, SD=5.48, t(23)=0.57, ns). This different discrimination performance in 
the two Experiments threatened our interpretation of Experiments 1A and 1B – raising the 
possibility that priming effects in Experiment 1A may have reflected marginal conscious 
perception of the prime shapes, rather than unconscious perception. To assess the 
likelihood of this possibility, we performed a Spearman’s Rank correlation analysis 
between Prime Congruency and Accuracy of discrimination in Experiment 1A that showed 
no relationship between them, r=-0.007, p=0.974 (plotting the two also revealed no 
FREE CHOICES ARE NOT SPONTANEOUS URGES                                                    14 
 
nonlinear pattern that might be missed by correlation). To further assess this possibility, we 
reanalysed Experiment 1A in terms of each observer’s percentage of congruent choices, 
excluding 8 observers from analysis that showed the greater negative discrimination effect 
so that performance for the remaining observers was at chance (t(16)=-0.54, ns). If our 
effects in Experiment 1A had been due to marginal conscious perception in some 
observers, the congruency effect should not have been evident in those observers; however, 
it was (t(16)=2.19, p=0.045, d=0.49).  
 
2.3 DISCUSSION 
In Experiment 1A, when observers’ were asked to make free choices, those responses were 
biased by external unconscious stimuli that had been associated with those responses in an 
earlier Training Phase. No such effect was evident when the responses were made 
according to an instruction to press when the observer felt an ‘urge’ to do so. The prime-
congruence effect on free choices (Expt. 1A) was a Negative Compatibility Effect-like 
(NCE; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998) in which choice associated with a particular, 
unconsciously-perceived stimulus is made less often, or more slowly than other choices. 
Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2002) initially described the NCE 
in terms of differences in response times, but those authors (Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004) 
have subsequently shown that the same effects can influence ‘free choices’. While 
Schlaghecken and Eimer attributed the NCE to a ‘self-inhibition’ process (see also 
Sumner, 2008), other authors have claimed that the effect is perceptual in origin and due to 
perceptual interactions between prime and mask (Lleras & Enns, 2004; Verleger, 
Jaskowski, Aydemir, Lubbe, & Groen, 2004). Indeed, the unexpected visibility below 
threshold found in Experiment 1A might, in principle, have reflected such mask-induced 
activations (Lleras & Enns, 2004; Sumner, 2008) on perceptual decisions in the 
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Discrimination Task. However, though of interest, this debate is not key to our current 
discussion. Rather, our effects form part of a growing literature in which unconsciously-
perceived stimuli appear to affect free choices (Parkinson & Haggard, 2014; Bodner & 
Mulji, 2010; Schlaghecken, Klapp & Maylor, 2009; Kiesel et al. 2006; Schlaghecken, & 
Eimer, 2004). What is new about the current work is that we distinguish clearly between 
responding on the basis of a ‘free’ choice versus on the basis of a ‘spontaneous urge’, 
finding an NCE in the former, but not the latter case. 
 Finally, one attractive feature of employing unconsciously-perceived prime stimuli 
in this first experiment was that they did not, it would seem, elicit responses effectively 
from observers in either the free choice or urge conditions. In this sense, the ‘free’ choices 
in Experiment 1A and the ‘urges’ that we hoped had prompted responses in Experiment 1B 
likely arose relatively spontaneously, without a major, immediate triggering influence of 
the prime stimulus. Such influences could have fundamentally changed the choices in our 
experiments and it was important to minimise them. 
 
3. Experiment 2 – Effects of action observed unconsciously under dichoptic viewing  
In Experiment 2, we sought to remedy some weaknesses in the design of Experiment 1. 
First, Experiment 1 had used a between-observers design that reduced its power. Secondly, 
the time restriction imposed in the task (observers had a maximum of 5 seconds to 
respond) may well have affected observers’ responses, compelling them to set their 
internal threshold for deciding that they had ‘felt an urge’ very low so as to respond in 
time. We additionally wondered whether the abstract shapes employed in Experiment 1 
and the simple stimulus-response associations we established in the Training Phase, may 
have been more suited to biasing free choices than to inducing ‘urges’ to move; the latter 
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are more associated with activity in the supplementary motor area (SMA; Fried et al. 1991; 
Fried et al. 2011). 
To these ends, Experiment 2 utilised dichoptic presentation to present short video 
sequences to the observer’s non-dominant eye. The video clip showed a person (Author 
MTM) pressing one of the two response keys on the keyboard used in the experiment 
(Schematised in Figure 5 for a series of stills). We expected that observing the action in 
movie would elicit responses in SMA (see Caspers, Zilles, Laird, & Eickhoff, 2010; 
Chong, Williams, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2008) and perhaps an ‘urge’ to move. To the 
other, dominant eye, a masking stimulus was presented simultaneously that was of 
sufficiently high-contrast as to render the movie presented to the non-dominant eye 
invisible (this effect is commonly referred to as ‘Continuous Flash Suppression’; Tsuchiya 
& Koch, 2004). A further advantage of this new approach was that it required no Training 
Phase to establish an association between the priming stimuli (the video clips) and each 
response. Accordingly, each observer could perform both the ‘Free Choice’ and ‘Urge’ 
Conditions, making the comparison of these two conditions within-observers (run order 
counterbalanced across observers). To further streamline this procedure, we removed the 
sequence of letters used in Experiment 1 and any need to remember those letters (we also 
ran a version with those letters present – see General Discussion). This minimised 
attentional load, which has been shown to suppress coding of action observation. Instead, 
we asked observers on each trial to indicate, in the free-choice condition of this new 
experiment, how free they felt in making a free choice, and in the urge condition, how 
strong was the urge that prompted them to press the button. This task still, however, 
retained a useful feature of the letter-memory component in Experiment 1 – to minimise 
intertrial response dependencies in choices/urges by interleaving another task between each 
choice/urge response. 
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3.1 METHOD 
3.1.1 Observers 
Twenty-four observers (Mean age=25.9, SD=4.5, 17 women) participated in this 
experiment and gave informed written consent for their participation. According to self-
report, all but four observers were right-handed, and all had normal or corrected to normal 
vision and hearing. All observers received payment of £7.  
 
3.1.2 Stimuli, Apparatus and Procedure 
The procedure for Experiment 2 consisted of two phases, conforming approximately to the 
Test Phases of Experiments 1A (free choice trials) and 1B (urge trials), but with the 
following exceptions. Observers viewed the stimuli via a mirror stereoscope housed in an 
unreflective, dark box, to enable dichoptic presentation. Prior to beginning the experiment 
a test of eye dominance was provided in which observers were asked to extend their arms 
straight out and form a small triangle with your hands, framing something nearby. (e.g. a 
doorknob) and place it in the centre of the triangle. After closing their eyes one at a time 
without moving the triangle, the dominant eye was the one that placed the object in the 
centre. We used this information to present one of two video clips to each observer’s non-
dominant eye on each trial. One of the video clips showed a person (author MTM) pressing 
the left response button on the computer keyboard used by the observer, and the other clip 
showed the same person pressing the right response button. Conscious perception of this 
video was suppressed by simultaneous presentation of a sequence of high-contrast images 
(3 every 85 msec) to the dominant eye, such that conscious perception was reliably of that 
stimulus and not the video (when the authors viewed it and according to the naïve 
observers’ subjective reports). 
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A fixation cross was presented for 5000 ms at the beginning of each trial. Then a 
repeating sequence of a video clip and accompanying masks (Figure 5) was presented, 
followed by an asterisk for 5 seconds (which blinked off momentarily every 500 msec). 
Observers were instructed to ignore the stimuli and to press a key with their left or their 
right hand in every trial without taking into account any previous choices. In the ‘free 
choice’ trials the instruction was to choose freely and independently to press the right (‘m’) 
or the left (‘z’) keyboard, as in Experiment 1A; during the ‘urge’ trials observers were 
instructed to monitor their own perception for any urge to press with the left or right hand 
and to press the corresponding key immediately (as in Experiment 1B). The order of the 
presentation of these two conditions was counterbalanced across observers. After every 
free-choice trial, the observer was prompted to rate (on a scale from 1-7) how ‘free’ they 
felt making their choice. After every urge trial, they rated how strong they felt the urge to 
be that prompted their response. Finally, observers answered a question about the 
subjective difference in performance felt between the two blocks. 
 
3.2 RESULTS 
As for Experiment 1, we plotted (Figure 6) the percentage of Congruent responses 
(observer responded on same side as in video clip) and Incongruent responses (observer 
responded on opposite side to the video clip) separately for trials with Free Choice 
Instructions (left-hand axis, left pair of columns) versus with ‘Urge’ Instructions (left-hand 
axis, right pair of columns). Visual inspection of the plot suggested that there was now no 
effect of the prime on response selection in the Free or Urge trials (confirmed in related t-
tests, t=-1.07, p=0.294 and -1.38, p=0.180, respectively) and no significant difference 
between these biases in Free versus Urge trials, t(24)=-1.35, p=0.189. However, the plotted 
RTs in Figure 6, suggested that Congruent RTs were slower than Congruent RTs in the 
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Free Choice trials, but not the Urge trials. The RT data were again analysed in a two-way 
(this time within-observers) ANOVA with the factors Task (free-choice vs. urge) and 
Congruency (congruent vs. incongruent). This yielded a main effect of Task, F(1,23)=6.25, 
p=0.020, η2p=0.21, - RTs were again faster for the free-choice block than for the urge 
block (2514.17 and 4658.33 msec, respectively), but there was no main effect of 
congruency F(1,23)=1.28, p=0.269. Crucially, however, there was a significant interaction 
between Task and Congruency, F(1,23)=4.90, p=0.037, η2p=0.18, - the difference between 
Congruent and Incongruent RTs was larger for Free Choice trials than for Urge trials. 
Related t-tests confirmed that incongruent choice RTs were shorter than congruent choice 
RTs (t(24)=-2.49, p=0.020, d=0.46) in the free choice trials, (M=2324.66 and 2703.68 
msec, respectively) with any non-significant trend arising in the opposite direction for 
Urge trials (t(24)=-1.36, p=0.187; M=4762.29 and 4554.36 msec, respectively). To 
investigate whether this pattern of RTs had reflected overall slower responses in the Urge 
trials, we reanalysed the RTs removing the three slowest RTs observers for the Urge 
condition and the three fastest for the Free choice condition, making RT means not differed 
(t(21)=0.18, ns; see Figure 7). This further ANOVA still showed an interaction between 
Task and Congruency (F(1,20)=5.73, p=0.026, η2p =0.22) even with reduced power, 
suggesting that as in Experiment 1, overall longer RTs in the Urge trials had minimised, 
rather than exaggerated the patterns of congruency effects we noted. 
At the end of the experiment, observers were asked informally about the visibility 
of the video clip during the task. None of them reported to have seen a hand pressing a 
button though some reported seeing some hands in a keyboard in a few trials, with no 
awareness that a key was being pressed. Brief analysis of the questions on each trial 
assessing how free the observer felt, or how strong their urge, are discussed in a 
supplementary analysis section following our description of Experiment 3.  
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3.3 DISCUSSION 
As in Experiment 1, we found dissociation between decisions made freely and decision 
based on urges over the reaction times. An NCE (shorter RTs for incongruent than 
congruent responses) was found for free-choices, the opposite overall trend in the Urge 
trials. Note that one could, in principle, argue that this result was a positive compatibility 
effect by redefining which trials were congruent in Experiment 2 and which, incongruent. 
As the hand in the video clip was of a person facing toward the observer, one might argue 
that when the person in the video clip pressed the button on the observer’s left with their 
right hand, that the congruent response would arise if the observer pressed the right button. 
While this is not crucial to our assumption that priming effects dissociate free choices from 
urge-based responses, we believe this is inconsistent with most previous literature (e.g., 
Shmuelof & Zohary, 2008). Instead, the finding of Experiment 2 seems to parallel that of 
Experiment 1, though in RTs, not response biases. Although this pattern of results seemed 
to parallel those of Experiment 1, and neither had found an effect of prime stimuli upon 
urge-based decisions, we intuited that this might be because the (largely unconscious) 
stimulus was too weak, or that it needed to be presented consciously in order to affect 
urges. Accordingly, we repeated Experiment 2, but using normal binocular viewing of the 
same video clips, without any different, competing stimulus. We had concerns that task-
demands might play a larger role now that the stimuli could be reliably, consciously 
perceived, but hoped that the strength of the action-observation effect would overwhelm 
any such effects. 
 
 
 
4. Experiment 3 – Effects of Conscious Action Observation 
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4.1 METHOD 
4.1.1 Observers 
24 observers (all over 18 years old, mean age 28.1, SD=7.2, 19 women) participated in this 
experiment and gave informed written consent for their participation. According to self-
report, all observers were right-handed, and all had normal or corrected to normal vision 
and hearing. All observers received payment of £7.  
 
4.1.2 Experimental Task and Procedure 
The procedure was similar to Experiment 2, except that the video clips, now centrally 
positioned within the display, were no longer viewed via the stereoscope but consciously 
perceived in the absence of other masking stimuli. 
 
4.2 RESULTS  
As for Experiments 1 and 2, we plotted (Figure 8) the percentage Congruent (observer 
responded on same side as in video clip) and Incongruent (observer responded on opposite 
side to the video clip) responses separately for trials with Free Choice Instructions (Left-
hand axis, left pair of columns) versus with ‘Urge’ Instructions (left-hand axis, right pair of 
columns). Visual inspection of the plot suggested that an NCE might be present in 
response bias for free choices (45.5% Congruent; SD=12.29), and the opposite pattern for 
urge trials (56.4% Congruent; SD=22.93) though the error bars are much larger than in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Indeed, although the difference between mean percentage of 
congruent choices for the two conditions was significant (related t-test (t(24)=3.03, 
p=0.006, d=0.53), it was only marginally significant from 50% (chance) for free choices 
(one-sample t-test, t(24)=1.81, p=0.083) and not so for the Urge task, (t(24)=1.37, 
FREE CHOICES ARE NOT SPONTANEOUS URGES                                                    22 
 
p=0.183). For RTs, a two-way, within-observers ANOVA with the factors Task (free-
choice vs. urge) and Congruency in RTs (congruent vs. incongruent) yielded no significant 
terms (all ps>0.15).  
 
4.2.1 Exploratory analysis of subjective ‘freedom’ and ‘urge strength’ in Expts 2 and 3 
Though these ratings’ primary function was to interleave a second task between 
choices to minimise inter-choice dependencies, we performed a crude analysis of these 
scores to reveal any strong correlations of subjective freedom/urge strength and object 
measures. We calculated, for each observer, their mean indicated subjective freedom rating 
and mean reported strength of urge and then compared observers with lower scores versus 
higher scores in terms of their response times and congruency effects. Given that our 
overall effects were confined (in terms of congruency) to the free-choice trials, we 
expected that any differences would emerge for those trials. This was not the case; high 
and low rating observers on the freedom ratings did not differ from one another in terms of 
average RT or percentage congruence for either study (RTs, both ps>0.520, Congruence, 
ps>0.087, this marginal pattern evident only in Experiment 2, so not further examined). 
Much more evident, in both Experiments 2 and 3, was that observers reporting stronger 
urges had faster RTs as a group in that condition (E2: 4609 vs 5906 msec, t(20)=1.97, 
p=0.064; E3: 1874 vs 2843 msec, t(21)=2.68, p=0.01). In plotting the relationship between 
reported urge strength and Congruence, we also noted a striking, chevron pattern which, 
when congruence was expressed in terms of absolute deviation from 50%, seemed to 
correlate markedly and negatively with urge strength (subsequently confirmed with a 
Spearman’s Rank correlation test r=-0.76, p<0.001; see Figure 9). The same strong trend 
did not emerge for Expt. 2 (r=-0.16, p=0.467), possibly a reflection of the conscious 
stimuli employed in Experiment 3 but not Experiment 2. This apparent relationship, as it 
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was only observed once, may simply have arisen by chance. Alternatively, it is consistent 
with the notion that strong endogenous urge signals in some observers are little affected by 
current external stimuli, while observers with weaker endogenous urge signals may be 
more subject to particularly strong, conscious external influences. We also performed the 
same analysis for the relationship between reported subjective ‘freedom’ and congruence 
(again as absolute deviation from 50%), which seemed to correlate negatively for Expt. 2 
(r=-0.48, p=0.016) and showed a similar, but nonsignificant, trend for Expt. 3 (r=-0.32, 
p=0.120). These effects are again too weak to support any strong claims. We hope to assess 
them further in future work.  
 
4.3 DISCUSSION 
Experiment 3 supported one finding from Experiment 1 and 2, of differential congruence 
effects in free choices versus urge based responses. Beyond this interaction, the pattern of 
responses was rather variable across observers, some seemingly adopting a conscious 
strategy of following the video, others doing the opposite. We anticipated that such 
conscious strategies would tend to generate very variable absolute congruency effects 
across different observers, masking the effect of prime congruency on free choices 
somewhat. However, despite this additional variation, the difference between congruence 
effects in free choice trials versus urge trials was as strong, or stronger than in Experiments 
1 and 2. This pattern suggests that each individual’s strategies, common to free- and urge- 
trials are overlaid on independent effects of the (in Experiment 3) conscious action-
observation stimuli.  
 
 
FREE CHOICES ARE NOT SPONTANEOUS URGES                                                    24 
 
5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Over the last thirty years, neuroscience has addressed the philosophical question of free 
will, focussing in particular on whether free choices can be predicted from their 
unconscious physiological antecedents. However, philosophers have resisted such 
conclusions, suggesting that when neuroimaging studies ask observers to respond when 
they ‘feel an urge’, this is conceptually distinct from asking them to make a free choice. 
Accordingly, neuroscience may have misdirected its measurements at cognitive processes 
that are distinct from those that philosophers consider to be free choices. When 
philosophers discuss whether choices are ‘free’ in the sense of being predetermined or not, 
they seem not to refer to urges (that might reflect mechanisms of e.g., homeostasis) but 
rather, choices (or picking). 
This distinctiveness of a free, ‘spontaneous’ choice versus a spontaneous urge to 
choose one particular option does not loom as large in the neuroscience literature, in which 
the term ‘free choices’ normally refers to choices that are not imposed on the observer by 
an external factor (Passingham & Lau, 2006) or not specified by external cues (free in a 
Hobbesian sense). This inclusive definition also encompasses acting on the basis of feeling 
an endogenous urge. Indeed, without a clear empirical distinction between free choices and 
spontaneous urges there has been no way to resolve this debate. On the one hand, there 
seems only a very slight pragmatic distinction between asking someone to choose freely 
one of two arbitrary options versus to choose one of those options on the basis of feeling a 
spontaneous urge to do so. On the other hand, an endogenous itch, for example, may be 
considered as closely related, perhaps equivalent to, an urge to scratch, but seems entirely 
distinct from a freely-made choice to scratch. Similarly, in smokers, the urge to smoke 
(when no relevant stimulus is present) is not equivalent to free choosing to smoke. 
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The aim of the present series of studies was to reveal a clear empirical dissociation 
between free choices and decisions based on spontaneous urges. To our knowledge, ours is 
the first study to attempt this, manipulating the task instructions given to observers. One 
obvious distinction between free choice and urge based responses is that response times 
(RTs) are in general faster for the former. A possible explanation according to observers´ 
reports is that they normally took longer in waiting for feeling an urge than when deciding 
to act freely. However, such data alone cannot provide an adequate distinction between the 
two conditions to suggest that they are different processes. Faster RTs in one condition 
than the other would still be consistent with a single noisy generator process underlying the 
two responses, but observers adopting different thresholds for responding under the two 
sets of task instructions. Indeed, when we took standardized scores of the two sets of RTs, 
the distributions were similar with no obvious differences in kurtosis or skewness across 
experiments.  
Rather the distinction observed here between free choices and urge based responses 
pertains to the effects of prime stimuli. We did not predict the pattern of findings that arose 
in our three experiments reported here – in each case there was a tendency for a negative 
compatibility effect (NCE) influencing responses when observers were asked to make free 
choices but not evident for responses made on the basis of endogenous urges. We did not 
describe here, a study similar to Experiment 3 that used the challenging letter-memory task 
from Experiment 1, likely minimising available capacity to process the complex prime 
videos. We collected a complete sample and did not find priming effects for either free or 
urge stimuli, presumably due to decreased ability to process the prime. This prompted use 
to switch to the easier task used in Experiments 2 and 3, though we hope to investigate 
attention-based effects in a future project. For now, the robust, recurring pattern in 
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Experiments 1-3 strongly suggests that urge and free choice tasks are different processes, 
evident in the selective presence of NCEs for free choices only. 
Why might NCEs only affect free choices and not urges? One obvious source of 
these different effects might be the urge instructions require interoception- observers to 
attend to their internal states, whereas asking observers to make free choices does not 
explicitly direct their attention internally.  Perhaps this internal attention rendered those 
urge-based responses driven by internal urges less susceptible to external stimuli. 
Alternatively, it may simply be that our observers’ free choices were rather well balanced 
on each trial, with no strong internal or external signal driving them to choose to press 
either button in particular. In contrast, when an observer feels an internal urge to make one 
response or another, that is a much stronger directional signal (which they are instructed to 
respond on the basis of). Accordingly, it may be that priming effects only affect behaviour 
reliably in the absence of other strong influences. This latter interpretation is consistent 
with one of the additional analyses we performed on the data from Experiments 2 and 3. 
When we correlated subjective strength of felt urges across observers with proportion of 
congruent responses in those trials, there was a strong, linear relationship indicating that 
stronger perceived urges were associated with minimal influences of prime stimuli. This 
relationship is by no means conclusive given that it was only observed once and in only 24 
observers, but it suffices to provide suggestive evidence for future research to follow-up. 
Though it was not our aim, our data may also speak to debates concerning the 
origin and nature of the NCE. There is vast literature in how unconsciously-perceived 
stimuli can influence not only motor responses (Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004; Hughes, 
Velmans, & De Fockert, 2009) but also cognitive control processes (Lau & Passingham, 
2007; Boy, Husain, & Sumner, 2010; Rahnev, Huang, & Lau, 2012). Our new findings 
provide evidence that this is the case not only for classical priming paradigms but also 
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when no targets are presented; it has been stated that free choice priming only occurs when 
the primes that are used are also being responded to as targets (O’Connor & Neill, 2011; 
Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004). However, we obtained a reliable NCE in free choices, both 
in response congruency (Exp 1) and RT congruency (Exp 2) when no targets are presented 
and thus no top-down templates searches can be implemented. Accordingly it would 
appear that such claims to not extend to the paradigms and samples reported here. 
Our results in the free choice conditions were consistent with the inhibitory 
threshold theory (Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2002) of NCE’s. On that view, the prime’s 
sensory strength must be sufficiently large that it triggers endogenous inhibition to prevent 
the system from becoming overloaded with repetitive information that is of no use. The 
negative congruency effect depends on the perceptual strength; strong response activations 
are actively inhibited, whereas weaker activations remain below a hypothetical inhibition 
threshold (Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2002). Our repeated prime presentation would have 
provided the right conditions for an NCE to emerge, on that view. Experiment 3 suggests, 
however, that stimuli do not need to be subthreshold in order to show similar patterns of 
effects to the other two experiments. Rather, that effect in the final study seems to have 
been overlaid with noise generated by observers’ idiosyncratic strategies and assumptions 
relating to the experimenters’ intentions (task demands) when they could perceive the 
primes consciously, and might guess the experimenter’s intention. Though it is very 
difficult to ascertain whether the stimuli presented in Experiments 1 and 2 were perceived 
in an exclusively unconscious manner, it seems as though that presentation likely achieved 
our aim of minimising the effects of task demands that arise for fully conscious stimuli. 
This did not necessarily reduce our effects of interest, however: NCEs in the free choice 
conditions of Experiments 1 and 2 were as reliable, or more so, than when the stimuli were 
consciously presented in Experiment 3. 
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In conclusion, we found consistent evidence for NCEs when observers were 
instructed to make free-choices, but no such evidence when observers were instructed to 
respond on the basis of a felt urge. NCEs therefore dissociate responses made (i) on the 
basis of instructions to make free choices from (ii) responses made when observers are 
instructed to press a button when they feel an urge to do so. Over the last thirty years, 
neuroscientific study of questions related to the philosophical question of ‘free will’ has 
treated these two tasks as equivalent. They are not, and this dissociation demands that the 
neuroscience refine its procedures in order to study ‘free’ choices.  
We hope these results will help refine tasks used at this part of the interface 
between neuroscience and philosophy. Only if such refinements keep pace with technical 
advances will neuroscience be able adequately to address such challenging topics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Funding. This project was made possible through the support of a grant from the John 
Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.  
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Figure Legends 
 
Figure	1.	Sequence	of	events	in	a	typical	trial	of	the	Training	Phase	in	Experiment	1.	On	half	of	
trials,	the		prime	shape	was	a	square,	always	followed	by	the	same	instruction	(e.g.,	'left')	and	on	
the	other	half,	the	prime	shape	was	a	diamond	always	followed	by	the	other	instruction	(e.g.,	
'right').	
Figure	2.	Sequence	of	events	in	typical	trial	of	the	Test	Phase	in	Experiment	1.	On	half	of	the	trial	
primes	were	squares	and	on	the	other	half,	diamonds.	
Figure	3.	Results	from	Experiment	1.	Mean	response	rate	(bars)	and	mean	reaction	times	(lines)	in	
Experiment	1A	(free	choices)	and	Experiment	1B	(urges),	plotted	separately	for	incongruent	and	
congruent	responses	in	the	Test	Task.	
Figure	4.	As	Figure	3,	but	for	RT-equalized	subsamples	of	Experiment	1A	and	Experiment	1b	
Figure	5.	Stimulus	events	and	trial	structure	in	Experiment	2.	Sequence	of	events	in	each	trial.	On	
half	of	the	trials,	the	video	clips	showed	a	finger	of	the	left	of	the	display	pressing	the	left	
response	key	on	the	keyboard	used	in	the	experiment,	on	the	remaining	trials,	a	hand	pressing	
the	right	response	key.		
Figure	6.	Results	of	Experiment	2.	Mean	response	rate	(bars)	and	mean	reaction	times	(lines)	in	
Experiment	1A	(free	choices)	and	Experiment	1B	(urges),	plotted	for	incongruent	and	congruent	
responses.		
Figure	7.	As	Figure	6,	but	for	subset	of	observers	with	equal	overall	RTs	for	Free	Choice	and	Urge	
Conditions.		
Figure	8.	Results	of	Experiment	3.	Mean	response	rate	(bars)	and	mean	reaction	times	(lines)	in	
Experiment	1A	(free	choices)	and	Experiment	1B	(urges),	plotted	for	incongruent	and	congruent	
responses		
Figure	9.	Scatter	diagram	for	the	correlation	between	observers'	urge	strength	ratings	and	
absolute	deviations	from	chance	of	percentage	congruent	responses.	The	x-axis	is	the	scale	on	the	
questionnaire	scores.	The	Y-coordinate	of	each	point	is	the	percentage	on	the	response	bias	for	
(in	absolute	values).		
 









